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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(e) , whereby the defendant in a district court criminal
action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final
judgment and conviction of any crime other than first degree or
capital felony.

TEXT OF STATUTES
AMENDMENT XIV, SECTION 1, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, §76-6-402(1)(1953 AS AMENDED)

76-6-402.

Presumptions and defenses. The following presumption

shall be applicable to this part:
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory
explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie
evidence that the person in possession stole the property.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, §76-6-408 (1953 AS AMENDED)
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property—Duties of pawnbrokers. (1)
A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the
property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing
that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds
or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any such property
from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, with a purpose to
deprive the owner thereof.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for paragraph (1) is
presumed in the case of an actor who:
(a) Is found in possession or control of other property stolen on
a separate occasion; or
(b) Has received other stolen property within the year preceding
the receiving offense charged; or
(c) Being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or
disposed, acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far
below its reasonable value.
(d) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business
dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal
property, and every agent, employee or representative of the
pawnbroker or person who buys, receives or obtains property shall
require the seller or person delivering the property to certify, in
writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the property. If the
value given for the property, exceeds $20 the pawnbroker or person
shall also require the seller or person delivering the property to
obtain a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the bottom of
the certificate next to his signature or any other positive form of
identification.
(i)
Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business
dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or
personal property, and every agent, employee or
representative of the pawnbroker or person who fails to
comply with the requirements of (d) shall be presumed to
have bought, received or obtained the property knowing it
to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. This
presumption may be rebutted by proof.
(ii)
When in a prosecution under this section it appears from
the evidence that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a
person who has or operates a business dealing in or
collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a
pawnbroker or person, that the defendant bought, received,
concealed or withheld the property without requiring the
person from whom he bought, received, or obtained the
property to sign the certificate required in paragraph (d)
and in the event the transaction involves an amount
exceeding $20 also place his legible print, preferably the
right thumb, on the certificate, then the burden shall be
upon the defendant to show that the property bought,
received or obtained was not stolen.
(3) As used in this section:
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or
lending on the security of the property;
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling
goods.
vii.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

In light of the instructions and evidence as a whole,

did Instruction No. 21 constitute reversible error because it
incorrectly stated the law and violated both federal and state due
process requirements?
2.

Was the evidence presented, all of which was

circumstantial, insufficient to support the conviction either
because it failed to pass the reasonable alternative hypothesis test
or because it was so inconclusive that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt of Ms. Martinez's guilt?
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction against Nancy
Wardle Martinez for Theft by Receiving, a felony in the third
degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1953 as amended).
The appellant was charged with Theft by Receiving, a second degree
felony, (See Addendum A ) , and was found guilty by a jury of the
lesser included offense of Theft by Receiving, a third degree
felony, on May 22, 1987, in the Third Judicial District Court, in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard H.
Moffat, Judge, presiding.

The Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge,

sentenced Ms. Martinez on May 22, 1987, to a term of zero to five
years at the Utah State Prison, which sentence was stayed and
appellant placed on probation for eighteen months.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Officer Scott Bell, a deputy sheriff witjh Salt Lake
County, conducted two interviews with Ms. Martinez during which she
related to him the following events (R. 223, 229-230).

On the night

of September 28, 1986, Nancy Martinez and her son went to a party at

Storm Mountain (R. 224). Ms. Martinez drove her car to the party
(R. 224). At the party, Ms. Martinez met a man named Michael Smith
(R. 225). Officer Bell testified that Ms. Martinez never told him
specifically how much she drank that night, but his impression was
that she had had a "couple of beers" (R. 226). However, in his
police report, Bell wrote that she told him she had consumed exactly
four beers at the party (R. 234).
After drinking the alcohol, Ms. Martinez began to feel
sick and dizzy (R. 225). The next thing Ms. Martinez remembered was
in her car as it was driven down the mountain by the man she met
named Michael Smith (R. 225-226).

Ms. Martinez then went back to

sleep (R. 226). She next remembered waking up when a police
officer, Deputy Walker, knocked on the window of her vehicle (R.
226) .
At approximately 9:00 p.m. of September 28, 1986, Deputy
Bruce Walker was driving westbound on 3900 South approaching the
intersection at 9th East (R. 188-189).
man with dark hair (R. 189-191).

He noticed a car driven by a

Officer Walker could see the man's

mouth moving, but could not see the face, eyes or mouth of the woman
(R. 191, 210). Because he saw the man's mouth moving, the officer
believed the pair was talking (R. 191). According to Officer
Walker, when the man noticed the police car next to him, he
"snapped" his head and looked at the officer with surprise (R. 191).
After passing through the intersection, the car pulled
behind some businesses in an area where vehicles did not usually go
(R. 193-195).

The officer made a U-turn, and followed the car
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(R. 195). Finding the car parked, he approached the vehicle and saw
the female passenger with her head leaned back (R. 196-197).
Officer Walker testified that the passenger, Ms. Martinez, looked
asleep (R. 211). There was a child, Ms. Martinez's son, asleep on
her lap (R. 198-199).

The officer did not see the man who had been

driving the vehicle (R. 197-198).
Officer Walker tapped his flashlight on the driver's side
door, and Ms. Martinez "stirred" (R. 198). This was the first time
the officer could see her eyes (R. 210). Officer Walker smelled
alcohol from the vehicle and later decided that Ms. Martinez had
been using alcohol (R. 210-211).

When asked where the driver was,

Ms. Martinez told the officer the driver was Mike Smith, and she
"didn't know why but that he got out of the car and said he would be
back in a minute" (R. 199). She also told the officer that she did
not know exactly where she was (R. 202).
Officer Walker saw a television and a blue bag with a
camera and flash attachment in the back of the vehicle (R. 200).
There were no blankets or other articles covering the items (R.
202).

Officer Walker asked Ms. Martinez whose car it was, and she

responded that it was her car (R. 202). She produced a registration
for the car, but it was registered in the name of Christy A. Moore
(R. 202).
Officer Walker impounded the car and inventoried the
contents of the vehicle (R. 203). In addition to the television,
camera bag, camera and flash attachment, the officer found a VCR and
two windbreakers (R. 200-201).

When asked whose property was in the

back of the car, Ms. Martinez said she had no idea (R. 202). She
- 3 -

never claimed the property in any way (R.2 15). She stated that she
did not know where it came from or how it got in the car (R. 215).
All property was seized from the back of the car (R. 216-217).
Officer Walker believed the items were stolen (R. 204).
After investigating, the officer learned that the items Mr. Daily
was missing matched the items he found (R. 205). Mr. Daily later
identified the items as those which were removed from his residence
(R. 173).
Of the two windbreakers which were found, the tan one
belonged to Mr. Daily and the black one belonged to Ms. Martinez (R.
108-109).

A watch belonging to Mr. Daily was found in the pocket of

the black jacket (R. 106-107).

The jacket appeared a little bit

large for Ms. Martinez (T. 109). Ms. Martinez had worn the jacket
at Storm Mountain; however, she later took the jacket off, wrapped
it around her son, and put on another coat (T. 109). Ms. Martinez
was not wearing the jacket when Officer Walker approached her
(T. 80).
Mr. Daily claimed that when he returned home on the
evening of September 28, 1986, he noticed two different sizes of
footprints in his rug (T. 53). He stated he was able to notice
these footprints because he had vacuumed his house before he left
and made no footprints on the rug himself (T. 53). Mr. Daily had no
expertise in footprinting, but tried to point out the footprints to
a police officer whose name he did not remember (T. 61, 62). Mr.
Daily did not mention the footprints to the initial officer or to
anyone else (T. 62). The officer he did mention them to did not
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take any pictures of the alleged footprints nor did Mr. Daily (T.
61-62).
Defense counsel took exception to Instruction No. 21
(R. 314) which stated:
Possession of recently stolen property, if not
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a
circumstance from which you may reasonable (sic)
draw the inference and find, in the light of the
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence of
the case, that the person in possession knew the
property had been stolen.
(See Addendum B.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court committed reversible error in giving
Instruction No. 21 to the jury.

The instruction did not correctly

state the law, but was an impermissible meshing of Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-402(1) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408(2)(1953
as amended).

The instruction violated both federal and state due

process requirements by relieving the State of its burden to prove
each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

In light of

the lack of both curing explanatory instructions and sufficiently
corroborating circumstances, the error was not harmless, but
prejudicial, requiring reversal.
The evidence presented, all of which was circumstantial,
was insufficient to support the conviction.

Ms. Martinez offered a

reasonable explanation of her innocence which the State not only did
not disprove but supported.

The conviction was based almost

entirely on inference and speculation. Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the jury verdict, it was sufficiently
inconclusive so that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt of Ms. Martinez's guilt.

ARGUMENT
POINT I, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN SUBMITTING INSTRUCTION NO, 21 TO THE JURY,
Nancy Martinez was convicted of theft by receiving, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, §76-6-408 (1953
as amended).

In its charge to the jury, the trial court included

the following instruction:
Possession of recently stolen property, if not
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a
circumstance from which you may reasonable (sic)
draw the inference and find, in the light of the
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence of
the case, that the person in possession knew the
property had been stolen.
(Instruction No. 21 - See Addendum B).

Defense counsel initially

objected and later took exception to this instruction arguing that
it included an improper inference (T. 56-57).
"Inferences and presumptions are common factfinding
devices whereby one fact is used to determine the existence of
another fact."

State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 325 (Utah 1985).

The Utah Legislature specified three separate situations which would
allow for a presumption of the requisite knowledge for a conviction
of theft by receiving in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408(2) (1953 as
amended).

Those presumptions are summarized as:
(a) possession or control of other property stolen
on a separate occasion; or
(b)

receipt of other stolen property within the
year preceding the receiving offense charged;
or,

(c)

being a dealer in property of the sort received
having acquired it for consideration which he
knows is far below its reasonable value.

The Utah Legislature also explicity created a presumption of prima
facie guilt of theft in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1) (1953 as
amended):

(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no

satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed
prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole the
property.
The standard for assessing the constitutionality of
presumptions used in jury instruction is "whether the challenged
jury instruction had the effect of relieving the State of the burden
enunciated in [rn Re] Winship [397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25
L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). . ." Chambers at 325, quoting Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2458, 61 L.Ed.2d 39
(1979).

That burden of proof is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of

every element necessary to constitute the crime charged.

In Re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

This

burden is required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, as well as
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

Winship, 397 U.S. at

364, 90 S.Ct. at 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d at 375; Chambers at 325.
In reviewing the constitutionality of a jury instruction,
"the potentially offending words must be viewed in the context of
the charge as a whole."

Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315, 105

S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344, 354 (1985).

The Utah Supreme Court

explained that "it is elementary that we read the language of an
instruction in light of its immediate context of the instructions as
a whole."

State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Utah 1986).

A.

INSTRUCTION NO. 21 DOES NOT CORRECTLY STATE
THE LAW.

The crime of theft by receiving requires that the person
have knowledge that the property is stolen or a belief that it
probably has been stolen.
amended).

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1)(1953 as

A presumption of this required knowledge is allowed in

three specific circumstances as detailed in the statute.
Ann. §76-6-408(2)(1953 as amended).

Utah Code

Those three circumstances are

summarized as:
(a) possession or control of other property stolen
on a separate occasion; or
(b) receipt of other stolen property within the year
preceding the receiving offense charged; or,
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received
having acquired it for consideration which he
knows is far below its reasonable value.
None of the circumstances contains any broad language which would
allow for a presumption of knowledge based on conditions not
specified by the Legislature.
Instruction No. 21, as provided for the jury in the
instant case, allows the jury to infer the requisite knowledge from
"possession of recently stolen property."

This basis for finding

knowledge is not one of the bases permitted by the statute. Even
the broadest interpretation of the statutory bases could not be
stretched to include the basis of Instruction No. 21. The Utah
Legislature could easily have included "possession of recently
stolen property" as a permissible basis for finding knowledge that
the property had been stolen if it had so desired.
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Having elected to not allow this basis, the trial court in the
instant case erred in so doing.
Instruction No. 21 is modeled after the presumption
allowed under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1)(1953 as amended).

That

section provides:
Possession of property recently stolen, when no
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made,
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person
in possession stole the property.
However, the "inference" contained in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1)
(1953 as amended) seems to require a "conscious" possession of the
property in order to trigger the "inference".

See State v. Smith,

726 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah 1986) footnote 1.
Instruction No. 21 impermissibly meshes and juggles the
language of the two statutes, in effect bootstrapping §76-6-402(1)
on to §76-6-408(2).

The instruction limits the application of the

former and enlarges the application of the latter,

instruction No.

21 is, therefore, a misstatement of the law and allowed the jury to
draw an inference which the legislature did not choose to allow.
B.

INSTRUCTION NO. 21 VIOLATED FEDERAL DUE
PROCESS REQUIREMENTS.

As noted above, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the State from employing jury instructions that
relieve the State of the burden of proof of each element of the
crime charged.

The determination of "whether a defendant has been

accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a
reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction."

Sandstrom

v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2456, 61 L.Ed.2d 39,
45 (1979).

This analysis "must focus initially on the specific
- 9 -

language challenged."

Francis v. Franklin/ 471 U.S. 307, 315, 105

S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344, 354 (1985).

The instruction must then

be viewed in the context of all the jury instructions because
another instruction "might explain the particular infirm language to
the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the
charge to have created an unconstitutional presumption."

Id., 472

U.S., at 315, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344, 354 (1985).
Instructions that "relate to the issue of guilt and
relieve the State of its burden of proof" violate due process.
State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987).

Particularly, "a

jury instruction using the language of U.C.A. 1953, §76-6-402(1) is
unconstitutional because it directly relates to the issue of guilt
and relieves the State of its burden of proof."
709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985).

State v. Chambers,

The Chambers Court stated unequivocally:

"Thus, the statutory language should not be used in any form in
instructing juries in criminal cases, and we expressly disavow the
language and holdings of our earlier cases to the contrary."
Chambers at 327; Turner at 1045 (Emphasis added).
Instruction No. 21 in the instant case used the language
of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1) (1953 as amended) "in any form".

The

instruction used the same basis for suggesting an inference of the
crucial element of knowledge as the theft statute did for a
presumption of guilt. However, theft by receiving requires the
three elements of possession, knowledge and intent. After inferring
knowledge from assumed possession, the final element of intent is
easily inferred based on instruction No. 13, (R. 72) (See
Addendum C) thereby establishing guilt.
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In State v. Smith, the challenged instruction
incorporated the language from the theft statute. Reading the
language of the instruction "in light of its immediate context and
the context of the instructions as a whole", the Smith Court found
that although the statutory language should not have been used, the
jury could not "have reasonably applied the instructions in an
unconstitutional manner."

Smith at 1234-1235.

In the challenged Smith instruction, the trial court
carefully added that if "from the evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt" you find that certain facts including possession existed,
"then you may infer from those facts that the defendant committed
the theft."
explained:

Smith at 1234. A later instruction in that case
"The mere fact that a person was in conscious possession

of recently stolen property is not sufficient to justify a
conviction of theft. There must be proof of other circumstances
tending of themselves to establish guilt."

Smith at 1235 n.l.

Instruction No. 21 did not include an explanation that
the jurors must find that Ms. Martinez had possession before making
any inferences.

Instead, the instruction seems to assume that Ms.

Martinez had possession.

Language similar to that in Smith, such as

"only if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Martinez was in
possession of stolen property can you make an inference from those
facts" would have informed the jury that they must first determine
whether Ms. Martinez had possession of the stolen property.
The instruction, after assuming possession, further
informed the jury that the ordinary and reasonable inference to be
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drawn based on such possession was that Ms. Martinez had knowledge
that the items were stolen, unless she could satisfactory explain
the possession.
From this language, a reasonable juror could have
interpreted the instruction as requiring an assumption of the
element of possession as well as strongly suggesting that the
"ordinary" and "reasonable" next step was an inference of the
element of knowledge. The phrase "if not satisfactory explained",
like the phrase "'may be rebutted1 could have indicated to a
reasonable juror that the defendant bore an affirmative burden of
persuasion once the State proved the underlying act giving rise to
the presumption."

Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S., at 318, 105 S.Ct.

1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344, 356 (1985).
Instruction No. 21 also did not contain any language
informing the jury that the mere fact that a person was in
possession of recently stolen property was not sufficient to sustain
a conviction, or that corroborating circumstances are required to
sustain a conviction.

Language requiring corroborating evidence

would have been critical in the present case since, unlike Smith,
there was no corroborating evidence to support Ms. Martinez's
conviction.
In Smith the evidence showed acts, falsehoods and
declarations sufficient "to support the permissive inference of
guilt."

Smith at 1235. Ms. Martinez never claimed possession of

the property or knowledge of where it came from (R. 215). She did
not try to hide the property (R. 202). She did not try to offer an
explanation which later proved false by the evidence.
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She did not,

unlike the defendant in Smith, do or say anything incriminating.
The inference of guilt or of knowledge that the property was stolen
was not sufficiently supported by corroborating evidence.
While the instruction does contain a permissive, rather
than mandatory inference, as reflected in the use of the word "may",
such a distinction is meaningless when the instruction is read as a
whole since the assumption of possession and the indication that an
inference would be reasonable seem to mandate that such an inference
be drawn.

Furthermore, similar permissive language was found to not

eliminate the instructional error in State v. Walton, 646 P.2d 689
(Utah 1982).

"Since [the jury] was given the option of employing

the presumption, we have no way of being assured that the defendant
was not convicted on the basis of that presumption."

Walton at 692.

While the charge to the jury in the instant case did
include general instructions regarding the state's burden of
persuasion and the defendant's presumption of innocence (R. 62, 65,
84), such instructions "do not dissipate the error in the challenged
portion of the instructions."

Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 320,

85 L.Ed.2d at 357.
In the present case there were two general instructions
«uxv,h attempted to remove any opinion or comment on the evidence by
the court, including the direction:

"If an instruction applies only

to a state of facts which you find does not exist, you will
disregard the instruction."

(R. 71, 89). If this attempted

explanation had immediately followed Instruction No. 21 in more
direct language such as, "If you find that the element of possession
does not exist, you may not make the inference of knowledge,"
- 13 -

perhaps the constitutional infirmity of No. 21 could have been
corrected.

However, as the instruction existed, the jury could have

interpreted and applied Instruction No. 21 in an unconstitutional
manner.
Based on the language of the challenged instruction and
its relationship to the instructions as a whole, the jury in the
present case could have found the instruction a conclusive
presumption of the element of possession or knowledge or both.

The

jury could also have found the instruction to shift the burden of
persuasion to Ms. Martinez on the element of possession or knowledge
or both.

lf

[B]ecause either interpretation would have deprived [Ms.

Martinez] of [her] right to the due process of law", the giving of
the instruction was constitutional error.

Sandstrom v. Montana, 442

U.S. 510, 525, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 51 (1979).
The constitutional infirmity of Instruction No. 21 was
not cured by sufficiently corroborating evidence, nor was it cured
by explanatory language within the same or other instructions.
Instruction No. 21, therefore, violated due process because it
related to the issue of guilt and relieved the State of its burden
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime
charged.

Furthermore, it used the language of Utah Code Ann.

§76-6-402(1) (1953 as amended), which was expressly prohibited in
Chambers.
C.

INSTRUCTION NO. 21 VIOLATED STATE DUE PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS.

Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.
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The language is similar to that of the Fourteenth Amendment and
therefore the argument set forth above is applicable to the Utah due
process provision.

Furthermore/ the State of Utah is free to

provide greater protections under its due process clause than those
provided by the federal constitution.

See generally "Recent

Developments in Utah Law", 1987 Ut. L. Rev. 79; See also State v.
Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986).
While the distinction, if any, between the protections
offered by the Utah due process clause and the federal due process
clause in the context of this case has not yet been decided, in at
least one instance the Utah Supreme Court has based a decision on
the state protection rather than relying on the federal clause.
In State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), this Court
held that the due process clause in the Utah Constitution prohibits
the refiling of criminal charges absent a showing of new or
additional evidence or other good cause. This Court noted that as
the federal law on this point was unsettled, it was better to
address the issue under the state constitution.
In the present case where the instruction misstated the
law and raised an impermissible inference, assuming that Ms.
Martinez possessed the property and informing the jury that a
reasonable inference to be drawn from that possession was knowledge
that the property was stolen, the instruction violated Ms. Martinez1
right to due process under the Utah State Constitution.

The other

instructions did not cure this infirmity and the lack of
corroborating evidence compounded the constitutional error.

D.

INSTRUCTION NO. 21 WAS PREJUDICIAL, REVERSIBLE
ERROR.

The Utah Supreme Court found the instructional error not
reversible in State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1236 (Utah 1986).
Although the statutory language used in Smith was error, the Court
held that "the instruction cannot be deemed reversible error in this
case in light of the clear explanatory instructions that all the
jury could make of the term "prima facie" was a permissible
inference."

Smith at 1236. As discussed above [See Point 1(B)],

the careful explanations present in Smith were not present in the
instant case. Lacking the protection of the explanations,
Instruction No. 21 may have been interpreted unconstitutionally,
thereby creating reversible error.
In State v. Turner, this Court found reversible error
even though defense counsel "failed to challenge the defective
instructions".

736 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah App. 1987).

"The

prejudicial effect of the presumptions created by the jury
instructions is especially clear in light of the slim evidentiary
basis for [defendant's] convictions."

Turner at 1046. As discussed

in detail below (See Point II), the-evidence offered to prove the
crime of theft by receiving was based on the fact that Ms. Martinez
was found asleep with a sleeping baby in her arms in the passenger
seat of the vehicle where the property was found (R. 211, 198-199).
Even the trial judge had difficulty finding possession based on the
facts (R. 253-254).

The State did not produce any evidence that Ms.

Martinez knew the property was stolen or that she intended to
deprive the owner of the property.

With such limited evidence to
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support Ms. Martinez's conviction, "we cannot say with any
confidence, on the whole record, that the constitutional errors in
this case were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Rose v.
Clark,

U.S.

, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)."

Turner at 1046.
In light of the violation of the State and federal
constitutions, Ms. Martinez respectfully requests that the
conviction be reversed and the matter be remanded for a new trial
free of such constitutional error.
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
THE CONVICTION OF THEFT BY RECEIVING.
At the close of the state's case in chief defense counsel
moved for dismissal based on the state's failure to present a prima
facia case (R. 239). After considerable discussion, the motion was
denied (R. 239-257, 261). Defense counsel renewed this motion both
at the close of evidence and before sentencing (R. 276, 115). After
admitting "I think the question is a close one", the trial judge
denied the motion (R. 283).
The power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a guilty verdict is well established.

For the

Court to reverse a conviction the Appellant must show that:
The evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted.
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

Furthermore, the

evidence must be viewed "in the light most favorable to the verdict

of the jury."

Petree at 444. The Utah Supreme Court stated that in

reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, the Court will "not
substitute our judgment for that of the jury, the unique function of
which is to evaluate the evidence and assess the credibility of the
witnesses."

State v. Speer, 718 P.2d 383, 385 (Utah 1986).

However, "notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's
decision this court still has the right to review the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the verdict."

Petree at 444.

The standard of review in cases involving only
circumstantial evidence is more severe.

"Where the only evidence

presented against the defendant is circumstantial, the evidence
supporting a conviction must preclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence."

State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986); State v.

Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976).
basis for this strict standard:

The Hill Court explained the

"This is because the existence of a

reasonable hypothesis of innocence necessarily raises a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's guilt."

Hill at 222.

As defined by the Utah Legislature and the Utah Supreme
Court:
In order to obtain a conviction for theft by
receiving, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt each of the following elements: (1) the
defendant received, retained, or disposed of the
property of another, (2) knowing that the property
had been stolen or believing that it probably had
been stolen, (3) with the purpose to deprive the
owner thereof.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1) (1953 as amended); Hill at 223. The
statute defines "receives" as "acquiring possession, control, or
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title or lending on the security of the property."
§76-6-408(3) (1953 as amended).

Utah Code Ann.

In the instant case, the state

attempted to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
the existence of the three required elements solely by
circumstantial evidence. While it is true that "circumstantial
evidence alone may be competent to establish the guilt of the
accused/1 State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1982), such
evidence will only be competent if it passes the higher standard
required in Utah by the Hill decision.
A.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CONVICTION IN THIS
CASE DOES NOT PASS THE HILL TEST.

In Hill, the Court found the evidence sufficient to prove
the first element of theft by receiving.

The defendants did receive

the stolen goods. Hill at 223. However, the Court also found that
the defendants offered an explanation which, "if true, would negate
the required second element of knowledge, as well as the third
element, specific intent."

Hill at 223. The explanation was

established through testimony from police officers showing that
defendants had explained that the merchandise was purchased in good
faith, that what was thought to be a valid bill of sale was
obtained, and that the defendants lacked any knowledge or belief
that the merchandise was stolen. Hill at 223. Once the defendants
offered this explanation, "The State, therefore, had the burden of
disproving this explanation beyond a reasonable doubt." Hill at 223.
It is not, therefore, the defendant's burden to prove his
explanation of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. Any explanation
of innocence which would, if true, negate an element of the crime,
- 19 -

requires that the state disprove such explanation beyond a
reasonable doubt. This burden is not one of merely suggesting a
conflicting theory and allowing the jury to decide which explanation
it finds more persuasive.

The state carries the heaviest burden in

relation to the offered explanation.

If the state does not disprove

the explanation beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury may not
convict.

If the jury does convict, the reviewing court must reverse

the conviction.
The conviction in the instant case requires reversal
since Ms. Martinez offered an explanation of her innocence which, if
true, would negate both the second and third required elements of
the crime of theft by receiving.

Mirroring the evidence offered in

Hill, Officer Bell testified that Ms. Martinez explained that she
had been asleep in the car from the time of driving down the
mountain until Officer Walker awakened her (R. 226). Officer Walker
testified that when he approached the vehicle Ms. Martinez looked
asleep with a child in her lap (R. 211, 198-199).

Ms. Martinez

never claimed the property found in the vehicle in any way.
(R. 215). She stated that she did not know where it came from or
how it got in her car (R. 215).
The testimony of Officers Bell and Walker showing that
Ms. Martinez had been drinking alcohol that night tends to support
the hypothesis that she was asleep during the time in question (R.
226, 234, 210-211).

The evidence incriminating the driver, Michael

Smith, also supported the explanation of innocence.
The State had the burden of disproving this explanation
beyond a reasonable doubt. The State attempted to meet its burden
- 20 -

through Officer Walker's unsupported assessment, "I felt that she
was pretending to be asleep."

(R. 211). Officer Walker offered no

explanation as to why he felt she was pretending.
his testimony only supported her explanation.

On the contrary,

The State also relied

on the fact that the watch was found in Ms. Martinez's jacket pocket
(R. 227-228).

Even if that evidence alone established possession,

it did not establish knowledge or specific intent sufficient to
disprove the explanation of innocence offered by Ms. Martinez.
Lastly, and least persuasively, Mr. Daily testified that he noticed
two difference sizes of footprints in his rug, one big and one small
(R. 174). Whatever this suggests, it does not prove or disprove
whether Ms. Martinez had the required knowledge or intent.
The State, therefore, did not meets its burden of
disproving Ms. Martinez's reasonable explanation of innocence beyond
a reasonable doubt. Without the required disproof, the "hypothesis
of innocence necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt."

Hill at 222. The evidence supporting the

conviction of Ms. Martinez in this case, taken as a whole, does not
meet the standard required by Hill.

Ms. Martinez respectfully asks

this Court to follow the Hill precedent and reverse her conviction.
B.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CONVICTION IN THIS
CASE DOES NOT PASS THE PETREE TEST.

This Court should be confident in reversing the
conviction in this case based solely on Hill since the language in
Hill requires the application of the "reasonable alternative
hypothesis" test. The often quoted standard of review defined in
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983), does not include this

"reasonable alternative hypothesis" provision.

The Petree standard

is controlling on the review of evidence supporting a conviction
where the evidence is not solely circumstantial. Although all of
the evidence presented in the instant case was circumstantial,
discussion of the Petree standard of review is offered in this brief
for the purpose of strengthening the argument.
The evidence offered in support of Ms. Martinez's
conviction is sufficiently inconclusive so "that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime" of theft by receiving.

Petree at 444. The

prosecution made its most persuasive case in attempting to prove the
existence of "receiving" or "acquiring possession or control", the
first element of the crime. Although the strongest, the evidence
offered to prove the first element is not strong enough to pass the
Petree test,

in the unlikely event that this Court would find the

first element sufficiently proven, the evidence cannot meet the
standard for the second element of knowledge or the third element of
specific intent.
The prosecution relied on a theory of constructive
possession to establish the first element.

The Utah Supreme Court

has held that constructive possession exists where the property is
"subject to (defendant's) dominion and control."

State v. Fox, 709

P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985); State v. Carlson, 635 P,2d 72, 74 (Utah
1981).

The Court further explained, "Ownership and/or occupancy of

the premises upon which the (property is) found, although important
factors, are not alone sufficient to establish constructive
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possession, especially when occupancy is not exclusive."

Fox at

319, citing United States v. Davis, 562 F.2d 681, 693 (D.C. Cir.
1977).

Evidence offered by the prosecution to show constructive

possession "must raise a reasonable inference that the defendant was
engaged in a criminal enterprise and not simply a bystander."

Fox

at 320.
In an attempt to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms.
Martinez "acquired possession or control" over the admittedly stolen
property, the state offered the following evidence:

Ms. Martinez

claimed ownership of the vehicle in which the property was found
(R. 202). Ms. Martinez was present in the vehicle when the property
was found (R. 197) and the watch was found in a jacket belonging to
Ms. Martinez that she had worn earlier in the evening (R. 227-230).
This evidence taken as a whole is sufficiently inconclusive.
Ms. Martinez's claimed ownership of the vehicle is
insufficient to establish constructive possession.

The car was

legally registered to Christy A. Moore (R. 202). Notably, the
vehicle was impounded because Ms. Martinez had no legally recognized
right to possession or control over the vehicle (R. 202-203).

Even

the trial judge, when addressing the prosecutor, alluded to the
inconclusive nature of the claimed ownership, "The car is not
registered to the name of the person who is sitting in it even
though they say, yes, it's my car" (R. 253).
Ms. Martinez's occupancy of the vehicle is equally
insufficient to establish constructive possession.

Her occupancy

was not exclusive until the driver fled the parked car just prior to
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Officer Walker's arrival. As a passenger in the vehicle, Ms.
Martinez did not have "dominion and control" over the vehicle. The
trial judge recognized the insufficiency of the occupancy argument
when he inquired of the prosecutor:
What do you do about the fact, Mr. Jones, that in this
case a minute and a half or two minutes earlier there had
been a different driver of this vehicle? The car is now
parked. That driver has disappeared. . . And (Ms.
Martinez) disclaimfs] any knowledge of how it came to be
in the car and any knowledge or any ownership of it or
anything of the sort. -Maybe—maybe you have an argument
that the driver of the car might be possessing because
he's in control of the vehicle. What do you do about a
passenger?
(R. 253-254).

Ms. Martinez was a bystander, a sleeping bystander,

with no dominion or control over the vehicle whatsoever.
The presence of the watch in Ms. Martinez's jacket is
equally insufficient to establish her dominion or control over the
watch.

Ms. Martinez had worn the jacket earlier at a party at Storm

Mountain, then taken it off to wrap around her son, and put on
another coat (R. 230). Ms. Martinez was not wearing the jacket when
Officer Walker approached her (R. 201). The jacket, present in the
vehicle, was as much under the control of the driver as it was Ms.
Martinez.

Any special control she had over the jacket ended when

she took it off.
In the unlikely event that this Court finds the evidence
of constructive possession sufficient to meet the Petree test, the
State must still meet the standard for the second and third
elements.

No direct evidence was offered to prove the second

element of knowledge or reason to believe that the property was
stolen.

The state argued that when someone is found in possession
- 24 -

of the stolen property, it may be inferred that the person knew or
had reason to believe the property to be stolen (R. 252-253).
Reliance on this inference is, therefore, completely contingent upon
the establishment of the first element of possession.
The prosecution finds support for the inference of
knowledge or reason to believe in the size of the items (R. 279).
The prosecutor argued that because the items "took up the entire
back seat of a small sub compact car", (R. 279), it is a natural
inference that Ms. Martinez would know or believe them to be
stolen.

The size of the items would support an inference that Ms.

Martinez knew of the presence of the items in the car. Knowledge of
the existence of the items does not, however, establish constructive
possession or justify the inference of knowledge or reason to
believe the property stolen.
The Petree Court illuminated the extent and limitation of
the power to review inferences:
In fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence
and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict,
the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary
fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean
that the court can take a speculative leap across a
remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict.
Petree at 445. Any conclusion that Ms. Martinez knew or had reason
to believe the articles found in the back of the car were stolen
based upon her presence asleep in the passenger seat of the car is
just such an impermissible speculative leap.

It is possible the

evidentiary fabric would have stretched to cover the inference of
knowledge if Ms. Martinez had been alone, awake and driving, or said
anything incriminating.

In the absence of any such evidence
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suggesting possession and knowledge, the jury was allowed to convict
Ms. Martinez by inferring from an inference, a process dangerously
close to a presumption of guilt.
Lastly, there is absolutely no evidence supporting a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the third element, purpose to
deprive the owner of his property.

Absent any evidence which

addressed the issue directly, the State apparently believed that yet
another inference, this time of specific intent, was permissible.
Even if the evidence proved that Ms. Martinez received Mr. Daily's
property, it was insufficient to prove that she did so with the
purpose of depriving Mr. Daily thereof.

Stretched "to its utmost

limits", the evidentiary fabric of this case does not cover the
inference of this specific intent. Petree at 445.
The evidence supporting the conviction in this case is so
sufficiently inconclusive that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that Ms. Martinez committed the crime
for which she was convicted.

The fabric of evidence does not cover

the gap between the presumption of innocence and the proof of
guilt.

Only pure speculation can sustain the jury's verdict. The

evidence does not, therefore, pass the Petree standard for
sufficiency.

Ms. Martinez respectfully asks this Court to reverse

her conviction in compliance with Petree.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellant, Nancy Wardle
Martinez, requests that this Court reverse her conviction of Theft
by Receiving and remand her case to the trial court for a new trial
or dismissal of the charges.
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by:
Assigned to:

E. Jones
E. Jones

Plaintiff,
BAIL

$5,000.00

v.
INFORMATION
NANCY W. MARTINEZ DOB 08/01/66,
Criminal No. ^ Q O Q ^ 1 3 H

r

^*

Defendant(s).

The undersigned S, Bell - SLCSO under oath states on
information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes of:
COUNT
THEFT BY RECEIVING, a Second Degree Felony, at 850 East 3900 South,
J
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September
28, 1986, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 408,
^ - - ^ Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
\\jilj*\
NANCY W. MARTINEZ, a party to the offense, received,
'
retained, or disposed of the property of Jeff Dailey,
knowing that the property had been stolen or believing that
it probably had been stolen, with the purpose to deprive the
owner thereof, and that the value of said property exceeded
$1,000.00;
THIS INFORMATION
WITNESSES:
S. Bell

J. Bell

IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED
B. Walker

(Continued on page Two)

Gaylord Dent

FROM THE FOLLOWING

Jeff D. Dailey

INFORMATION

STATE v. NANCY W. MARTINEZ
County Attorney #86-1-70976
Page Two
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant
based
86-87912.

this

Information

on

police

report

Mr. Dailey discovered a burglary at his home. The defendant
was stopped in a motor vehicle within one (1) hour of the burglary.
In the car was a T.V. , VCR, camera and watch, valued in excess of
$1,000.00. The property was identif ied/b'y?Mr. Dg^ley as. itjyns taken
during the burglary.

SubsGribpd." and. £v£$tn to before me

Authorized for presentment and
filing:
T.L. "TEDM CANNON, County Attorney
, Deputy
kmp/2826E
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ADDENDUM B

INSTRUCTION NO
Possession

of

recently

SJ
stolen

property,

if

not

satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which
you may reasonable draw the inference and find, in the light of
the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence of the case,
that the person in possession knew the property had been stolen.

ADDENDUM C

:NSTRUCTION NO, /
Under

the

laws

of

the

State

^
of Utah,

the

intent

with

which an act is done denotes a state of mind and connotes purpose
in

so

acting.

susceptible

of

ordinarily

be

circumstances.

Intent,
proof

by

inferred

being
direct
from

a

state
and

of

mind,

positive

acts,

is

not

evidence

conduct,

always

and

statements

must
or

